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INTRODUCTION 
n the December 2012 Japanese general election, Shinzō Abe, 
President of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),1 ran on a 
platform of a return to prewar nationalism and more importantly, 
much needed economic reform.2 The LDP won 294 seats in the 480-
seat lower house of the National Diet3 and secured Abe’s position as 
the next Prime Minister.4 The win reflects a shift in national priorities 
in response to China’s increasing influence in east Asia, as well as its 
increasing role in international politics.5 The win also reflects Japan’s 
ongoing need to address the economic stagnation6 that has been 
crippling its economy since the early 1990s.7 
This need to address its decades-long economic stagnation is, and 
has been, a priority in Japan since the early 1990s. Postwar Japan 
enjoyed an economic boom in the second half of the 1950s, which 
eventually tapered off in the mid to late 1980s.8 During the mid to late 
 
1 The LDP is a far-right political party in Japan. Aside from an eleven-month period 
between 1993 and 1994, and a three-year period from 2009 to 2012, the LDP has enjoyed 
virtually continuous postwar power since its inception in 1955. This dominate presence in 
the Japanese parliament is a reflection of the country’s homogenous culture. LARRY JAY 
DIAMOND & RICHARD GUNTHER, POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY 143 (2001); RAY 
CHRISTENSEN, ENDING THE LDP HEGEMONY: PARTY COOPERATION IN JAPAN 11–19 
(2000). 
2 Japan’s Election: Shinzō Abe’s Sumo-Sized Win, THE ECONOMIST: BANYAN (Dec. 
16, 2012, 19:02), http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2012/12/japans-election 
[hereinafter Japan’s Election]; Japan’s Shinzō Abe Unveils Cabinet After Voted in as PM, 
BBC (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-20842840. 
3 The National Diet is Japan’s bicameral legislative body composed of the lower house, 
or House of Representatives, and the upper house, or House of Councillors. The lower 
house has the power to choose the prime minister. Shōichi Izumi, Japanese Politics: 
Focusing on the National Diet, 7 INT’L J.L. LIBR. 121, 122 (1979). 
4 Isabel Reynolds & Takashi Hirokawa, Japan’s LDP Reclaims Power in Landslide 
with Abe Stimulus, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/articles/2012-12-16/japan-voters-go-to-polls-with-ldp-forecast-to-topple-noda-s-dpj; 
Abe’s LDP Dominates Election: Noda Resigns After DPJ Humiliation, THE ASAHI 
SHIMBUN (Dec. 17, 2012), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ2012121 
70006. 
5 Abe’s Master Plan, THE ECONOMIST (May 18, 2013), http://www.economist.com 
/news/leaders/21578044-shinzo-abe-has-vision-prosperous-and-patriotic-japan-economics 
-looks-better. 
6 Id. 
7 Japan’s current debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio is an astounding 227.9%. 
Country Comparison: Public Debt, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, CENT. INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2186 
rank.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). 
8 Shigenori Shiratsuka, The Asset Price Bubble in Japan in the 1980s: Lessons for 
Financial and Macroeconomic Stability 43 (IMF-BIS Conference on Real Estate 
I 
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1980s, Japan also experienced an asset price bubble that eventually 
burst in the late 1980s to early 1990s.9 The causes of the economic 
bubble and its subsequent burst during this period are varied and 
complex,10 but can generally be attributed to “intensified bullish 
expectations” of Japan’s financial markets at the time.11 The bursting 
of the bubble ushered in an era of economic stagnation that has 
persisted for much of the past twenty years.12 This period is often 
referred to as the lost decades.13 Although Japan has seen some 
economic rebounds since 2010, these have been negligible and 
temporary.14 Therefore, permanent structural reforms aimed toward 
long-term economic growth are needed for Japan to sustain itself as a 
major player in global markets. 
A. Abenomics 
Abenomics refers to the economic reform policies advocated by 
Prime Minister Abe.15 Abenomics involves three “arrows” designed 
to jump-start the Japanese economy: fiscal stimulus, monetary easing, 
and structural reform.16 
 
Indicators & Fin. Stability, Working Paper No. 21, 2003), http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf 
/bispap21e.pdf. 
9 Id. 
10 A detailed analysis of the causes of the bubble economy and its subsequent burst 
goes beyond the scope of this Article. For more information on the Japanese bubble 
economy, see BAI GAO, JAPAN’S ECONOMIC DILEMMA: THE INSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF 
PROSPERITY AND STAGNATION (2001). 
11 Shiratsuka, supra note 8, at 44. 
12 See Leika Kihara, Japan Eyes End to Decades Long Deflation, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 
2012, 4:29 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/japan-economy-estimate-idUSL4E8JH1T 
C20120817. 
13 Lost Decades: The Japanese Tragedy, THE ECONOMIST: FREE EXCHANGE (Aug. 3, 
2012, 4:32 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/08/lost-decades; 
Japan’s Revival Strategy (Prime Minister of Japan & His Cabinet, Working Paper), 
https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/en_saikou_jpn.pdf. 
14 Japan’s GDP fell by 0.5% in 2011, increased by 1.8% in 2012, increased again by 
1.6% in 2013, and fell by 0.1% in 2014. Data: GDP Growth (Annual %), THE WORLD 
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (last visited Mar. 19, 
2017). 
15 Shinzō Abe, Prime Minister of Japan, Speech at the Japan National Press Club: 
Growth Strategy (Apr. 19, 2013) (transcript available at http://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe 
/statement/201304/19speech_e.html) [hereinafter Growth Strategy Speech]. 
16 Surbhi Jain, Shinzō Abe’s Third Arrow: Structural Reforms to Boost Japan’s Growth, 
MKT. REALIST (July 14, 2015, 4:22 PM), http://marketrealist.com/2015/07/shinzo-abes      
-third-arrow-structural-reforms-boost-japans-growth. 
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The structural reform arrow further involves five goals: (1) to 
“break government monopolies,” (2) to “reform hiring and firing 
policies for companies in order to enhance labor productivity,” (3) to 
“reform Japan’s overly restrictive healthcare sector,” (4) to “increase 
female workforce participation,” and (5) to “deregulate markets in 
order to boost competitiveness.”17 
The focus of this Comment is on the fourth goal of the third arrow. 
Specifically, this Comment will examine the goal of increasing 
female workforce participation and its implications for gender 
equality in Japan, as well as its conformity with the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), to which Japan is a signatory country.18 
B. Female Workforce Participation 
Japan has “one of the best educated [yet] most underused female 
populations in the developed world.”19 As of 2015, the labor force20 
participation rate of Japanese women ages fifteen to sixty-four was 
66.7%, lower than other developed nations (Figure 1).21 
  
 
17 Surbhi Jain, Which Parts of Japan’s Economy Most Need Reform Right Now?, MKT. 
REALIST (July 14, 2015, 4:23 PM), http://marketrealist.com/2015/07/japan-need-reform/ 
(emphasis added). The term “third arrow” in the singular is a bit of a misnomer: it is “more 
of a shotgun blast than an arrow.” Austin, Abenomics 3 Arrows Explained: Finally You 
Can Understand What’s Going on Inside Abe’s Head, TOFUGU (Sept. 19, 2014), 
http://www.tofugu.com/2014/09/19/the-3-arrows-of-abenomics-explained. Reform in 
Japan: The Third Arrow, THE ECONOMIST (June 28, 2014), http://www.economist.com 
/news/leaders/21605905-shinzo-abe-has-best-chance-decades-changing-japan-better-he     
-seems-poised (“Part of its strength is its breadth: it is less a single arrow than a 1,000-
strong bundle of acupuncture needles.”). 
18 Harold Hongju Koh, Why America Should Ratify the Women’s Rights Treaty 
(CEDAW), 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 263, 270 (2002). 
19 Leo Lewis, Japan: Women in the Workforce, FIN. TIMES (July 6, 2015), https://www 
.ft.com/content/60729d68-20bb-11e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79. 
20 Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Consideration of 
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Fifth Periodic Report of 
States Parties (Japan), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/JPN/5, at 11 (Sept. 13, 2002) [hereinafter 
Japan’s Country Report] (defining “labor force” as “the sum of the employed and the 
unemployed over the age of 15”). 
21 Labor Force Statistics by Sex and Age - Indicators, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION 
& DEV., https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LFS_SEXAGE_I_R (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2017). 
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Figure 1. 
Ideally, bringing this number as close to one hundred percent as 
possible would add millions of people to a shrinking workforce and 
could significantly increase the GDP. This rate tends to drop in most 
countries after women marry and have children.22 The drop creates a 
M-shaped curve in which the female labor force participation rate 
increases until marriage and child-bearing age.23 Japanese culture 
encourages women not to work during a child’s early formative 
years.24 Thus, the female labor participation rate drops significantly 
between ages twenty-five and thirty-four, a range in which women are 
most likely to have newborns, forming the distinctive middle point of 
the M-shape.25 The labor force participation rate drops again at 
retirement, which forms the eventual decline of the M-shape. The M-
shaped curve is common in most countries around the world, but 
 
22 Japanese Women and Work: Holding Back Half the Nation, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 
29, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21599763-womens-lowly-status        
-japanese-workplace-has-barely-improved-decades-and-country [hereinafter Japanese 
Women and Work]. 
23 Id. 
24 See Akiko Nosaka, The M-Shaped Dilemma: Life Strategies and Fertility Trends 
Among Working Women in Contemporary Japan, 48 ETHNOLOGY 21, 23 (2009). 
25 Id. 
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distinctly more pronounced in east Asian countries like Korea and 
Japan (Figure 2),26 where traditional gender roles are culturally more 
emphasized.27 
Figure 2. 
Furthermore, among those women in the workforce, few actually 
hold professional, managerial, or leadership positions due to corporate 
culture imposing a “‘bamboo ceiling’ [that is] . . . thick, hard and not 
even transparent.”28 Employers often prefer men for management-
track positions while placing women in clerical roles with little 
promotional opportunities.29 These hiring preferences stem from 
societal expectations that women will eventually have to quit after 
they marry and have children.30 
 
26 Labor Force Statistics by Sex and Age - Indicators, supra note 21. 
27 Japanese Women and Work, supra note 22. After their first child, seventy percent of 
Japanese women stop working for a decade or more, a sharp contrast from thirty percent of 
American women. Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Abe acknowledged this cultural inadequacy in an April 2013 speech: “The reality is 
that a large number of women are still faced with choosing between raising a child or 
having a job.” Growth Strategy Speech, supra note 15. “One of the questions they asked at 
interview was ‘are you planning to have a baby?’ That would be illegal in a lot of 
countries.” Lewis, supra note 19. 
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C. History of Japanese Gender Equality Laws 
The history of Japan’s antidiscrimination laws began with its 
postwar Constitution. Enacted on May 3, 1947, the Japanese 
Constitution contains an equal rights provision, Article Fourteen, 
which states: “All of the people are equal under the law and there 
shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations 
because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.”31 Judicial 
interpretation, however, renders Article Fourteen’s practical 
applications weak and, furthermore, it is limited to only public sector 
discrimination.32 During the American occupation in 1947, the Labor 
Standards Law (LSL) was passed.33 Its shortfall, however, was in the 
fact that it regulated discrimination only as to wages, leaving 
“employers free to discriminate in other areas such as hiring, training, 
promotion, firing, and job assignment.”34 In response to this shortfall, 
the courts created the “public order doctrine,” derived from Article 
Nine of the Civil Code, which declares null and void juristic acts 
“contrary to public policy or good morals.”35 While this worked to 
improve gender equality in some instances, it was largely ineffective 
as a whole since civil law jurisdictions rely on statutory authority 
rather than judicial decisions.36 
In 1985, Japan ratified CEDAW, the “central and most 
comprehensive document” highlighting the efforts of the United 
Nations Commission on the Status of Women,37 in response to 
pressure from the international community.38 In the same year Japan 
passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) in order to 
comply with CEDAW despite resistance from the business 
community.39 Thus, the 1985 EEOL was a compromise between 
 
31 Nihonkoku Kenpō [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 14, para. 2 (Japan). 
32 Kristina T. Geraghty, Taming the Paper Tiger: A Comparative Approach to 
Reforming Japanese Gender Equality Laws, 41 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 503, 506 (2008). 
33 Megan L. Starich, The 2006 Revisions to Japan’s Equal Opportunity Employment 
Law: A Narrow Approach to a Pervasive Problem, 16 No. 2 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 551, 
554 (2007). 
34 Geraghty, supra note 32, at 506–07. 
35 Id. at 507. 
36 Id. at 507–08. 
37 OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CEDAW.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 
2017). 
38 Geraghty, supra note 32, at 508–09. 
39 Id. at 509–10. 
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CEDAW and the local business community.40 This is the beginning 
of a theme prevalent throughout this Comment, starting with the 
ratification of CEDAW and persisting to the present: treaties ratified 
and laws enacted for the wrong reasons are likely to be ineffective. 
The EEOL extended protections to more areas compared with that of 
the LSL, which only covered wages.41 While the EEOL prohibited 
discrimination in some respects, in others, it merely laid out 
exhortations.42 In the 1990s, the pitfalls of the EEOL became clear 
and, in 1997, the Diet strengthened it to be more forceful and 
commanding than merely suggestive.43 Finally, in 2006, the Diet once 
again amended the EEOL to expand its applicability and scope.44 
This history, from the postwar Constitution, to the LSL, to the 
ratification of CEDAW, to the 2006 EEOL, and finally to Abenomics’ 
promotion of gender equality, represents leaps and bounds for 
antidiscrimination laws in Japan. But it still has a long way to go. 
This Comment makes three arguments: First, the purpose of 
Abenomics’ third arrow casts doubt on its ability to accomplish the 
goal of increasing women’s presence in the workforce. Abenomics is 
primarily an economic reform policy and as such, its focus on 
improving gender equality takes a backseat. Thus, it is uncertain 
whether Abenomics in its present state can do much to improve 
gender equality in Japan. Second, the gender equality aspect of the 
third arrow does not conform to the strict mandates imposed upon 
member countries to CEDAW. As a policy tailored around economic 
reform, Abenomics never took into consideration CEDAW 
requirements. Thus, Abenomics falls short of what Japan agreed to 
when it ratified CEDAW in 1985. Third, Abenomics’ conformity with 
CEDAW and the overall goal of boosting the economy are not 
mutually exclusive. Conforming with CEDAW and improving the 
economy do not conflict; that is to say, it is possible for the two to 
harmoniously coincide. Finally, this Comment will briefly present a 
counterpoint, or theory, as to why Prime Minister Abe has not taken 
stronger and more forceful measures to improve gender equality in his 
reform policy. 
 
40 Id. at 510. 
41 Id. at 506. 
42 Id. at 510–12. 
43 Kelly Barrett, Women in the Workplace: Sexual Discrimination in Japan, 11 HUM. 
RTS. BRIEF 5, 6 (2004); Starich, supra note 33, at 558–60; Geraghty, supra note 32, at 
515–18. 
44 Starich, supra note 33, at 561–65. 
TUCKER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/24/2017  6:16 PM 
2017] Implications of Abenomics on Gender Equality in Japan 551 
and Its Conformity with CEDAW 
I 
THE PURPOSE OF THE THIRD ARROW CASTS DOUBT ON ITS ABILITY 
TO ACCOMPLISH ITS GOALS 
The overall goal of Abenomics is to “permanently get[] the 
Japanese economy out of deflation.”45 Specifically, the permanent 
structural reforms aspect of the third arrow is intended to address a 
problem that has emerged in the decades following the collapse of the 
bubble economy. The problem is of the declining population46 and 
thus a declining national workforce. 
A. Addressing Financial Insecurity 
The lost decades resulted in a shift away from Japan’s traditional 
lifetime employment model toward contract work, or non-formal 
employment, as a result of the collapse of the bubble economy.47 
Many young people in Japan have been stuck in a situation where 
they cannot secure long-term employment due to the economic 
decline.48 This financial insecurity among the working population 
means that young people are reluctant to settle down and have 
children, which further exacerbates the declining birthrate problem.49 
 
45 Chie Aoyagi et al., How Inclusive Is Abenomics? 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. WP/15/54, 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1554.pdf. 
The declining population, coupled with longer life expectancies, results in an inverted 
pyramid population structure. As time goes on, pensions of the elderly majority—the base 
of the pyramid located at the top—will increasingly rely on diminishing wages of the 
younger minority—the tip of the pyramid located at the bottom. Japan’s Country Report, 
supra note 20, at 10; Andrew Joyce, Upside Down: The Population Pyramid Problem, 
WALL STREET J.: JAPAN REAL TIME (Oct. 1, 2010, 7:23 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/japan 
realtime/2010/10/01/upside-down-the-population-pyramid-problem. 
46 See Japan Population Shrinks by One Million Census Confirms, BBC (Feb. 26, 
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35666274. During the five-month period 
between September 1, 2015, and February 1, 2016, the total population declined by 
66,000. Population Estimates: Monthly Report for Feb. 2016, STATISTICS BUREAU, 
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMM’N, http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/Other 
ListE.do?bid=000001007603&cycode=1 (last visited Mar. 19, 2017); Diana Magnay, Can 
‘Womenomics’ Save Japan?, CNN (May 22, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/21 
/business/japan-women-economy-womenomics (“The IMF forecasts Japan’s population 
will shrink by around 30% by 2055.”). 
47 Junya Hamaaki et. al., Changes in the Japanese Employment System in the Two Lost 
Decades 1, 9–10 (Econ. & Soc. Res. Inst., Working Paper No. 18, 2011), http://www.esri 
.go.jp/jp/archive/new_wp/new_wp020/new_wp018.pdf. 
48 See id. 
49 See Joel Stewart, Portland State University, An Investigation into Japan’s 
Population: The Current State of Decline, GEOGRAPHY MASTERS RES. PAPERS 11–13 
(2007). 
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The problem is a circular one because improving financial security 
requires increasing the population, yet increasing the population 
requires improving financial security. Japan recognizes the need for 
drastic structural reform in order to exit this circular loop of financial 
meltdown. The difficulty arises in identifying inherent differences 
between the first two arrows and the third arrow of Abenomics. The 
first two arrows, fiscal stimulus50 and monetary easing51—meant to 
“prop up the Japanese economy in the short run”52—are relatively 
easy to implement because internal monetary policy modifications 
involves money and numbers, which are simpler and more predictable 
than human behavior. 
Conversely, the third arrow—structural reforms “meant to secure 
Japan’s long term growth and economic health needs time to take 
effect”53—is more difficult to implement because it involves 
changing complex and unpredictable human behavior. Indeed, the 
implementation of the first two arrows thus far has been lauded as an 
overwhelming success.54 On the other hand, the third arrow 
endeavors to change, among other things, deeply ingrained, long-held 
cultural beliefs about traditional gender roles in a historically 
conservative and homogenous society. Although the participation of 
women in the workforce is only one aspect of Abenomics, it is the 
most important part of the reform policy55 and the most difficult to 
implement. 
B. Addressing Gender Equality 
The structural reforms aspect of the third arrow has less to do with 
gender equality than it does with economic development, which casts 
 
50 See Robert E. Hall, Fiscal Stimulus, 139 DAEDALUS 83, 83 (2010) (defining fiscal 
stimulus as a fiscal policy of increased public expenditures or decreased taxation in order 
to encourage and support economic growth). 
51 A monetary policy in which a central bank purchases securities from the market to 
lower interest rates and increase the money supply. See What is Quantitative Easing?, THE 
ECONOMIST: THE ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.economist.com 
/blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/economist-explains-5. 
52 Austin, supra note 17. 
53 Id. 
54 Jain, supra note 17 (“Since Abe took over in 2012, the Japanese stock market has 
surged, outperforming all major developed markets . . . . Japanese stocks are up by almost 
70% (in local currency) since late 2012.”); see also Surbhi Jain, Japan Outperforms 
Markets So Far This Year, MKT. REALIST (May 8, 2015, 9:58 AM), http://marketrealist 
.com/2015/05/japan-outperforms-markets-far-year. 
55 Growth Strategy Speech, supra note 15 (“[A]ctive participation by women . . . forms 
the core of my Growth Strategy.”). 
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doubt on the third arrow’s ability to accomplish true, long-term, and 
permanent economic growth. In times of positive economic change, 
things could simply revert to the way things were. One should keep a 
keen eye of skepticism on a staunch conservative and traditionalist 
who pushes for gender equality. In fact, in the past, Prime Minister 
Abe had pushed for women to accept more traditional roles, reasoning 
that this would promote child-rearing: 
In 2005, when a previous government was taking steps towards 
greater [gender] equality, Mr Abe and his fellow conservatives 
warned of the damage to family values and to Japanese culture that 
could result if men and women were treated equally. They worried 
that rituals such as the hina matsuri, or Festival of Dolls, an annual 
celebration of young girls and the state of matrimony, could be 
endangered. Their concern was not just based on tradition; keeping 
women out of the workforce, conservatives thought, made 
economic sense too. If the country’s “baby-making machines,” as a 
former LDP health minister put it, stayed at home then they would 
produce more babies, and thus more workers.56 
Furthermore, if the goal is to increase workforce participation and 
thus productivity, there are two non-mutually exclusive alternatives: 
increase female workforce participation or loosen strict immigration 
policies. An isolationist past weaves xenophobia into the very fabric 
of Japanese society, thus, the Japanese government has always been 
reluctant to permit more immigrants to fill the shoes of a declining 
workforce.57 So Prime Minister Abe’s plan, to increase female 
workforce participation at the exclusion of loosening immigration 
policies only out of necessity, is misguided and destined to fail unless 
more robustly-rooted measures are taken. As for increasing the 
overall workforce, loosening immigration policy is the single easiest, 
quickest, and most effective solution to implement.58 Yet, Prime 
Minister Abe’s opting for the more difficult route—keeping borders 
tight to maintain traditional notions of Japanese identity—is 
surprising in light of the availability of a simpler alternative. 
 
56 Japanese Women and Work, supra note 22. 
57 Lewis, supra note 19 (“The minister is keen to navigate the politics of the debate to 
prevent them becoming too divisive. Particularly fraught is where the womenomics debate 
overlaps with one on increased immigration—a sensitive issue for the Abe government. 
Asked whether Japan’s women might be helped back into work by an influx of migrants to 
work as nannies or nurses, Ms. Arimura, [Prime Minister Abe’s minister for women’s 
empowerment], declares that the idea is ‘not a panacea.’”). 
58 Stewart, supra note 49, at 15–16. 
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II 
THE THIRD ARROW DOES NOT CONFORM TO THE STRICT MANDATES 
IMPOSED UPON MEMBER COUNTRIES TO CEDAW 
The issue is whether Prime Minister Abe’s proposed measures to 
increase women’s presence in the workforce accord with the 
mandates of CEDAW. CEDAW is an international treaty and was an 
attempt to combat discrimination against women more 
comprehensively and effectively59 than the Charter of the United 
Nations, which simply reaffirms the “faith . . . in the equal rights of 
men and women.”60 It represents “a climax [in the] United Nations 
[sic] efforts to codify comprehensively international legal standards 
for women.”61 CEDAW was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
1979, and currently 189 countries have ratified it.62 Japan ratified the 
treaty on June 25, 1985.63 
The key to understanding CEDAW’s purpose is in its title: The 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women. The inclusion of the words, “all forms” is intentional 
because CEDAW seeks not only to eliminate those direct or overt 
forms of discrimination, but also other indirect or incidental forms 
which have the effect or purpose of discrimination against women.64 
Prime Minister Abe has laid out measures65 that he intends to 
 
59 A Fact Sheet on CEDAW: Treaty for the Rights of Women, AMNESTY INT’L, 
https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/cedaw_fact_sheet.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2017). (stating that CEDAW “is the only international instrument that 
comprehensively addresses women’s rights within political, civil, cultural, economic, and 
social life”). 
60 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
Preamble, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 15–16 [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
61 Fourth World Conference on Women, Report by the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination Against Women, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/7 (June 21, 1995). 
62 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
U.N. Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General 
(MTDSG), Chapter IV.8 (Dec. 18, 1979), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG 
/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-8.en.pdf (showing a record of the signatories and parties 
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). 
63 Id. 
64 CEDAW, supra note 60, at 15–16 (emphasis added) (“Determined to implement the 
principles set forth in the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women and, for that purpose, to adopt the measures required for the elimination of such 
discrimination in all its forms and manifestations.”). “[T]he term ‘discrimination against 
women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which 
has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise 
by women . . . of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, 
social, cultural, civil or any other field.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
65 Growth Strategy Speech, supra note 15. 
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implement in order to satisfy the structural reforms aspect of the third 
arrow of Abenomics. These measures involve changes in leadership, 
childcare waiting lists, support for a return to work, and assistance for 
reentering the workforce.66 
A. Leadership 
In a 2013 speech, Prime Minister Abe called for a minimum of 
thirty percent of leadership positions in all areas of society to be filled 
by women by 2020.67 Furthermore, he called for all listed companies 
to proactively appoint women to executive and managerial positions 
and to appoint one female as an executive officer.68 In a “practice 
what you preach” exemplification, the LDP tapped two women in 
2012 to serve in two of its four executive posts.69 While the goal of 
achieving a minimum of thirty percent of women in leadership 
positions in all areas of society by 2020 is commendable, Prime 
Minister Abe’s methods seem lacking or nonexistent for two reasons. 
First, mere exhortations for companies to be proactive is akin to 
doing nothing at all. Recall the failures of the 1985 EEOL, discussed 
in this Comment’s introduction, in which the same sort of good faith 
request to comply was ineffective. Companies, like people, are self-
interested and will generally do only what is necessary to promote 
their interests. Traditionally, maximizing the bottom line is generally 
the end goal of companies in a capitalistic system.70 So some 
companies may adopt Prime Minister Abe’s request assuming that 
doing so would have, in some way, a positive effect on their bottom 
line. More than likely, most companies would simply maintain the 
status quo. Otherwise, companies would have promoted gender 
equality on their own even without the insistence of Prime Minister 
Abe. Instead, the Prime Minister should create subsidies—similar to 
energy subsidies that the United States has used in the past to 
 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Reiji Yoshida, Abe Taps Two Women for Key Posts in LDP: Move Seen as Attempt to 
Gain Support from Female Voters, JAPAN TIMES (Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.japantimes 
.co.jp/news/2012/12/26/national/abe-taps-two-women-for-key-posts-in-ldp/#.Vt8qh5Mr 
JP2; Growth Strategy Speech, supra note 15. 
70 Steve Denning, Is the Goal of a Corporation to Make Money?, FORBES (Sept. 26, 
2011, 12:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/09/26/is-the-goal-of-a 
-corporation-to-make-money/#319f3f8e54ed. 
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encourage car-buyers to opt for cleaner energy vehicles71—to 
incentivize the promotion of women to top managerial positions. 
Second, the LDP’s “practice what you preach” approach is not 
inspirational. It amounts to factitiously putting a female face on the 
same outdated values that the LDP covets. For example, one of the 
women appointed by the LDP government, Sanae Takaichi, a long-
time Abe supporter and conservative, has “emphasized traditional 
family values and opposed revising the law to allow women to keep 
their family name after marriage.”72 
1. CEDAW Article II 
Contrary to Prime Minister Abe’s preferred method of 
implementation, in fact, CEDAW requires more than mere 
suggestions for companies to be proactive. Article II requires that 
parties to CEDAW “embody the principle of the equality of men and 
women in . . . appropriate legislation . . . and to ensure, through law 
and other appropriate means, the practical realization of this 
principle.”73 Although Japan does have legislation promoting 
principles of equality between men and women,74 lagging societal 
norms have not yet caught up with the law.75 Thus, Prime Minister 
Abe’s proposals regarding women in leadership fall short of minimal 
acceptable standards that CEDAW requires because they do not 
“ensure, through law . . . , the practical realization of . . . principle[s] 
[of equality].”76 Subsidies or similar incentives would be a prudent 
first step toward adherence to the law and ensuring conformity with 
CEDAW. 
Article II further goes on to state that parties must “adopt 
appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where 
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women.”77 Here, 
Prime Minister Abe’s exhortations, due to their voluntary nature, fall 
short of legislative measures to ensure the realization of his stated 
 
71 E.g., Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, 26 U.S.C.A. § 30D (2015). 
72 Yoshida, supra note 69. 
73 CEDAW, supra note 60, at 16. 
74 See, e.g., Koyō no bunya ni okeru danjyo no kintō na kikai oyobi taigū no kakuhotō 
ni kansuru hōritsu [Danjyo koyō kikaikintō hō] [Act on Securing, Etc. of Equal 
Opportunity and Treatment between Men and Women in Employment], Law No. 113 of 
1972, amended by Law No. 45 of 1985, Law No. 92 of 1997, and Law No. 82 of 2006 
(Japan); see also Barrett, supra note 43, at 1–2. 
75 See Barrett, supra note 43, at 3–4. 
76 CEDAW, supra note 60, at 16 (emphasis added). 
77 Id. at 16. 
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goals. Article II also requires parties “[t]o establish legal protection of 
the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through 
competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective 
protection of women against any act of discrimination.”78 Japan does 
have competent national tribunals which can, and do, hear gender 
discrimination cases under the EEOL; however, three bureaucratic 
problems limit enforcement of the EEOL.79 First, as a civil law 
jurisdiction which emphasizes statutory rule of law, Japanese judicial 
decisions are often inconsistent.80 Second, litigation is long and 
expensive in Japan; on average, cases take about five years to move 
through the first-level of appellate review.81 Finally, cultural aversion 
to, or public shaming of, engaging in litigation is a widely held 
sentiment.82 For these reasons, despite a competent court system, not 
all of the EEOL-based claims were being litigated83 resulting in 
ineffective protection. 
Article II also states that parties must “take all appropriate 
measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, 
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination 
against women.”84 The difficulty, of course, is that customs and 
practices are deeply entrenched85 and thus require something more 
than mere surface-level legislation for any lasting impact to take 
effect. This is an issue perhaps better addressed by the Japanese 
Ministry of Education. In order to conform with Article II(f) of 
CEDAW, the Ministry of Education should articulate and implement 
strategic plans for revamping compulsory education to include more 
lessons on equality and human rights. Only then might progress come 
to fruition in the coming decades regarding customs and practices of 
how the country thinks about equality. Such a plan would be a long 
 
78 Id. (emphasis added). 
79 Barrett, supra note 43. 
80 Id. at 2–3. 
81 Id. at 3. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 6. 
84 CEDAW, supra note 60, at 16 (emphasis added). 
85 Traditional Japanese society has stressed the Confucian ideal of ryōsai kenbo or 
“good wife, wise mother.” Barrett, supra note 43, at 1; Geraghty, supra note 32, at 505. 
The government used the phrase during the Meiji restoration period—a late-1800s era 
characterized by Japan finally drawing to a close its near two hundred years long 
isolationist foreign policy—as a slogan to promote the ideology that women’s role in 
society was as a mother and educator whose priorities are to the home and family. Barrett, 
supra note 43, at 1. 
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and slow, yet sustainable route; long-term growth cannot be 
accomplished with quick fixes and short-sighted solutions. 
2. CEDAW Article XI 
A significant problem with Prime Minister Abe’s proposals is that 
they only focus on measures that increase the aggregate quantity of 
women in the workforce, yet are silent as to issues of equal treatment 
of women who are already working. Perhaps some of the starkest 
differences between men and women in the Japanese workforce have 
to do with selection criteria and pay.86 However, these are issues that 
Abenomics does not address, indicating that it is more about 
traditional economic production than gender equality. Furthermore, 
Prime Minister Abe’s proposals, at least regarding leadership, only 
focus on a small slice of society—“elite women who are top 
managers”—while ignoring the everyday woes of the majority of 
Japanese working women.87 
Article XI of CEDAW addresses equal employment opportunities, 
stating that 
[p]arties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in the field of employment in order to 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights, in 
particular . . . [t]he right to the same employment opportunities, 
including the application of the same criteria for selection in matters 
of employment.88 
Here, Prime Minister Abe’s goal of achieving a minimum of thirty 
percent of leadership positions to be filled by women by 2020 
promotes CEDAW’s “right to the same employment opportunities” 
provision. The Prime Minister’s request to the private sector, 
however, is just that: a request without the force of law. So, despite 
his lofty goals, Prime Minister Abe’s method of implementation—a 
request to proactively appoint women to executive and managerial 
positions and to appoint one female as an executive officer—falls 
short. Furthermore, Prime Minister Abe’s plan is silent on other issues 
of unequal selection criteria between job-seeking men and women in 
Japan, or the dual-track system. The dual-track system refers to a 
 
86 Lewis, supra note 19. See generally H.J. Jones, Japanese Women and the Dual-
Track Employment System, 49 PACIFIC AFFAIRS 4 (1976). 
87 Ayai Tomisawa & Ritsuko Ando, In Abenomics’ Shadow, Japanese Women Fight 
‘Maternity Harassment’, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014, 5:10 PM), http://www.reuters.com 
/article/us-japan-women-idUSKCN0HJ2BA20140924. 
88 CEDAW, supra note 60, at 18. 
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common practice in Japan in which men and women are placed into 
two different career tracks whose promotional potential differs.89 
Next, Prime Minister Abe’s proposals appear adequate in their 
efforts to alleviate the acuteness of the M-shaped curve with respect 
to equal employment opportunities after pregnancy. The proposals, 
however, are silent as to other collateral consequences of child-
rearing that Japanese women face—namely harassment. Harassment 
of Japanese women in the workforce who become pregnant is so 
widespread that the term “maternity harassment” has become 
commonplace.90 Japanese culture values the women as the primary 
child-rearers.91 Thus, women are expected to become stay-at-home 
mothers and devote their time to the children. Often, when a Japanese 
woman becomes pregnant, employers will demote the woman or 
encourage her to resign without actually firing her.92 These types of 
actions are typical of the indirect and non-confrontational subtleness 
of Japanese society. Traditional cultural norms encourage the 
proliferation and continued practice of harassment and discrimination 
in clear violation of the law. 
Article XI states, “[p]arties shall take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination . . . to ensure . . . the same rights, in 
particular . . . [t]he right to equal remuneration, including benefits, 
and to equal treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as 
equality of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work.”93 
Prime Minister Abe’s proposals, with the economy as its focus, do not 
address equal treatment and thus, do not conform to CEDAW’s 
requirements. 
B. Childcare Waiting Lists 
Abenomics’ proposal to reduce waiting lists for childcare facilities 
addresses a problem that keeps Japanese women of child-rearing age 
out of the workforce: unavailability of childcare facilities. Prime 
Minister Abe plans to use the Yokohama method94 to accelerate the 
 
89 Jones, supra note 86. 
90 Tomisawa & Ando, supra note 87. 
91 See Barrett, supra note 43, at 5. 
92 See id. 
93 CEDAW, supra note 60, at 18 (emphasis added). 
94 The Yokohama method refers to a rapid, three-year expansion of daycare facilities 
accomplished by the city of Yokohama in 2010 to accommodate a waiting list of more 
than 1500 children. Jun Hongo, How Yokohama Led the Way in Day Care, WALL ST. J.: 
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elimination of childcare waiting lists. The idea is to increase funding 
for state-subsidized childcare facilities to ease the burden of child-
rearing and make it easier for women to return to work post-
pregnancy.95 The plan includes five aspects: (1) to provide vigorous 
support to non-registered childcare facilities in hopes that these 
facilities seek to be registered in the future;96 (2) to make small-scale 
childcare facilities having less than twenty children under care and 
extended-hour childcare facilities at kindergartens eligible to receive 
support;97 (3) to prepare childcare options to have a rapid impact by 
promoting new entries by a variety of entities, such as rented 
facilities, and also, “by relaxing the requirements for providing 
childcare arrangements within places of employment;”98 (4) to 
“secure a sufficient number of childcare providers;”99 and (5) to 
create a “[n]ew [s]ystem for [c]hildren and [c]hild-rearing.”100 This 
last aspect involves two goals: to “prepare childcare arrangements for 
200,000 children” and to “aim at the elimination of childcare waiting 
lists by securing childcare arrangements for 400,000 children by 
2017.”101 
This portion of Prime Minister Abe’s plan spurs a debate about the 
best methods for accomplishing Abenomics’ goals, and it highlights 
how Japanese policymaking so often fails. First, an alternative 
method for accomplishing Abenomics’ goals of eliminating childcare 
waiting lists would be to open up immigration policies. This way, 
immigrant workers could fill the demand gaps for childcare facilities. 
But the Abe administration is not yet willing to address the situation 
by these means. It seems Prime Minister Abe sees immigration as a 
last resort, perhaps because Japan is an island nation whose 
isolationist past reverberates into present cultural ideologies. Thus far, 
the economic situation has not yet sunk low enough to the extent that 
policymakers would be willing to undertake such measures of last 
resort. 
 
JAPAN REAL TIME (May 23, 2014, 6:07 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2014/05 
/23/how-yokohama-led-the-way-in-day-care. 
95 Growth Strategy Speech, supra note 15. 
96 Id. Until now, such unregistered facilities were not eligible for national support. Id. 
97 Id. Until now, such small-scale and extended-hour facilities were not eligible to 
receive assistance. Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. Only 380,000 of the 1.13 million licensed childcare providers are actually 
working. Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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Second, the conundrum highlights how Japanese policymaking so 
often fails. In this instance, governmental attempts at tight control 
over how to fix the problem in fact hinders progress toward fixing the 
problem. Government subsidies make daycare centers affordable yet 
represent a huge drain on public spending.102 This insufficient 
availability of funding creates a market deficiency, and there remains 
a high demand for daycare facilities.103 Normally, this is where 
private-sector businesses come in to fill the gap however, “regulations 
restrict the ability of private-sector daycare operators to build new 
centers.”104 The industry was partially deregulated in 2000, but 
persistent restrictions continue to hinder the private-sector daycare 
industry in Japan.105 
C. Support for a Return to Work 
The Abe administration seeks to achieve longer childcare leave for 
new mothers intending to return to work. Presently, “the length of 
childcare leave allowed under the Child Care and Family Care Leave 
Act is . . . one year.”106 According to surveys, as many as sixty 
percent of participants indicated that they would like to take longer 
than a year.107 Further, as many as thirty percent of survey 
participants specifically indicated that they would like to focus on 
raising their child until the child reaches about three years old.108 
There are three aspects to this plan. 
First, to involve men more in child-rearing in order to promote an 
environment where both spouses equally participate.109 This would 
help ease the burden placed on women so that they may focus more 
on work. After the child reaches the age of three, both spouses should 
be able to return to their workplaces with surety.110 Second, although 
participation would be voluntary, the Abe Administration seeks to 
 
102 See Minami Funakoshi, Japan Cries Out for Daycare: Tokyo Makes the Childcare 
Shortage Worse by Trying Too Hard to Fix It, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.wsj 
.com/articles/SB10001424127887324653004578651310946954352. 
103 Id. (“Subsidies for state-sponsored daycares skew demand while leaving the 
government unable to afford expansion.”). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Growth Strategy Speech, supra note 15. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 See id. 
110 Id. 
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establish a new subsidy or incentive program.111 The program would 
support companies “that actively embrace ‘three-year childcare leave’ 
and work to expand . . . the active participation of families with small 
children.”112 Finally, the Abe Administration plans to address the 
problem of whether people who take time off will be able to keep 
pace after lengthy blank spots in their career.113 To do this, Prime 
Minister Abe plans to provide comprehensive support for people’s 
“return to work after three years of being close to the children.”114 
This would involve introducing new programs that would enable 
people to relearn skills at universities or technical colleges before they 
return to their jobs in full swing.115 
Involving men more in the child-rearing process conforms with 
CEDAW, whose preamble states: 
Bearing in mind the great contribution of women to the welfare of 
the family and to the development of society, so far not fully 
recognized, the social significance of maternity and the role of both 
parents in the family and in the upbringing of children, and aware 
that the role of women in procreation should not be a basis for 
discrimination but that the upbringing of children requires a sharing 
of responsibility between men and women and society as a 
whole[.]116 
CEDAW’s preamble further states that CEDAW is “[a]ware that a 
change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in 
society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between 
men and women.”117 
Finally, Article V states: 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures: (a) To modify the 
social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a 
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and 
all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or 
the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men 
and women; (b) To ensure that family education includes a proper 
understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition 
of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing 
and development of their children, it being understood that the 
 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 CEDAW, supra note 60, at 15. 
117 Id. 
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interest of the children is the primordial consideration in all 
cases.118 
Clearly, equal participation between the sexes in the child-rearing 
process is an underlying principle that CEDAW embraces. Thus, 
Prime Minister Abe’s plan to involve more men in the child-rearing 
process is in accord with CEDAW. The problem, however, is that he 
does not expound on how one would implement such a plan and 
leaves it open-ended. It will be interesting to observe in the coming 
years how Japan’s leadership will address this aspect of Abenomics. 
Next, using subsidies to encourage companies to adopt a three-year 
childcare leave policy is a step in the right direction; however, why 
not change the law? Extending the Child Care and Family Care Leave 
Act from one year to three years is a more effective and longer-lasting 
solution. Finally, introducing new programs that would enable people 
to relearn skills is a good idea in theory. Practical implementation, 
however, will require a more nuanced analysis taking into account 
budgetary constraints or cheaper alternatives. 
D. Assistance for Reentering the Workforce 
The final aspect of the Third Arrow of Abenomics is to facilitate 
reentry into the workforce.119 This involves support in three areas. 
First, assistance that enables a return to the workforce at any time by 
people who, rather than take childcare leave, resigned from their 
company to focus on childrearing over a number of years.120 Second, 
support for reemployment of people who focused on raising their 
children over many years, making use of new internship endeavors 
and the trial employment system.121 Finally, provisions of financial 
assistance necessary for those people who wish to make use of their 
experiences raising children and take the opportunity to start their 
own company.122 
 
118 Id. at 17. 
119 Growth Strategy Speech, supra note 15. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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III 
ABENOMICS’ CONFORMITY WITH CEDAW AND THE OVERALL GOAL 
OF BOOSTING THE ECONOMY ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE 
Japan’s ratification of CEDAW was an impetus for progressive 
social changes in Japanese law in the 1980s and 1990s.123 However, 
the disconnect between legal implications and entrenched social 
norms continue to hamper Japanese society because discrimination 
persists.124 Japan now has an opportunity to advocate for Abenomics’ 
conformity with CEDAW and thus pressure the Diet and Prime 
Minister Abe to do something more than provide mere 
recommendations and subsidy incentives. Namely, the Japanese 
public should pressure Prime Minister Abe to push for legislation that 
would mandate a quota of women in leadership positions and permit 
three-year childcare leave. Additionally, the Japanese people should 
speak out against social, economic, and structural barriers to the court 
system—major factors severely limiting effective enforcement of the 
progressive 1997 EEOL.125 
Abenomics’ goal of boosting the economy is not at odds with 
CEDAW. In fact, they run parallel.126 However, this is a complicated 
issue that permeates almost every aspect of Japanese society, so 
things will not change quickly or without a fight. Change will take 
time and needs to start at a basic level of education and changing 
public perceptions regarding traditional gender roles. 
The first step in achieving Abenomics’ gender equality goal of the 
third arrow is not simply to request that the private sector change its 
policies—something more is needed. The primary implementation 
tool to increase women’s presence in the workforce should be the 
alignment of the goals of Abenomics with CEDAW’s requirements. 
In so doing, the focus will be on gender equality and economic 
development as compatible goals. Half-hearted attempts at shallow or 
superficial changes will not last, and the situation will invariably 
relapse at the first sign of economic improvement. Only if Japan takes 
this approach will it be able to achieve the kinds of long-term, 
permanent improvements to the economy that it seeks. 
 
123 Geraghty, supra note 32, at 508–10; Barrett, supra note 43, at 6; Starich, supra note 
33, at 556. 
124 Barrett, supra note 43, at 7–8. 
125 Id. 
126 Aoyagi et al., supra note 45, at 4 (“Excessive inequality is corrosive to growth.”). 
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Japan should see this as a two-fold opportunity not only to achieve 
the economic ambitions that Abenomics seeks, but also to finally 
push the country toward concrete gender equality in conformity with 
CEDAW. At the end of the day, without an enforcement arm, 
CEDAW really is nothing more than a comprehensive and practical 
blueprint for change,127 and once ratified, it is up to the people and 
their respective governments to pass legislation or implement other 
changes. CEDAW is only as strong as the people’s will, and if people 
do not fight for change, CEDAW can remain ineffective and stagnant. 
As it stands, Prime Minister Abe’s proposals do not go far enough. 
He is balancing his need to jump-start the economy with his 
reluctance to accept outside help. This strategy is invariably destined 
to fall short unless more effort is put forth. 
IV 
A COUNTERPOINT: LESSONS FROM THE LIBERAL LEGALISTS 
Prime Minister Abe has reservations in enacting legislation to 
improve gender equality associated with Abenomics. These 
reservations may be the result of learned lessons from the rather 
short-lived field of law and development during the 1960s. 
Broadly defined, law and development is an area of study that 
examines “the relationship between the legal systems and the 
‘development’ . . . [of] Third World countries”128 and attempts to 
answer the question of how to use law as an instrument to promote 
development.129 In this context, development means “social, 
economic and political changes;”130 thus, law and development 
attempts to answer the question of how to use law as an instrument to 
promote social, economic, and political changes. Scholars in the law 
and development field—or the liberal legalists—however, quickly 
discovered that law in itself may not actually be the best or most 
effective means to achieve widespread changes in a society.131 This 
discovery was the result of a breakdown of the assumptions of their 
 
127 CITIES FOR CEDAW FACT SHEET, http://citiesforcedaw.org/wp-content/uploads 
/2017/01/CEDAW-USFact-Sheet-_10-22-15.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2017). 
128 David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some 
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. 
L. REV. 1062, 1062 (1974). 
129 See id. 
130 Id. 
131 See id. at 1079. 
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liberal legalist model.132 One such assumption was that rules, created 
by the state, guide the behavior of individuals in a society, rather than 
social or cultural factors.133 For example, their model assumed that 
“state institutions are the . . . [center] of social control,” but the reality 
in many Third World countries was that the local community or tribal 
leadership carried more influence than the state.134 Their model also 
assumed that “courts are central . . . [to] social control and . . . 
[independent] from political, tribal, religious, or class [influence];” 
however, “in many nations courts are neither very independent nor 
very important.”135 In failing to consider that their assumptions may 
be erroneous, the liberal legalists misjudged the effectiveness of law 
as a means to change.136 
Perhaps Prime Minister Abe is heeding the lessons of his academic 
predecessors. The liberal legalists attempted to impose law as a potent 
means to achieve a goal premised on erroneous assumptions.137 
Conversely, the Prime Minister is reluctant to implement reformist 
policies and forceful legislation to reduce gender inequality in Japan. 
This reluctance may well reflect an understanding that such 
legislation may not actually hold the force or potent power of change 
that one might initially believe it to hold. 
Furthermore, it is important to note the difference in context 
between what the liberal legalists were facing and what Prime 
Minister Abe is facing. The liberal legalists were essentially trying to 
export an idealized version of the United States to Third World 
countries138 they did not understand well. On the other hand, with 
Abenomics, Prime Minister Abe is attempting to implement changes 
within his own country, a place with which he is more culturally 
familiar than law and development scholars were with Third World 
countries. Indeed, one of the initial challenges to the liberal legalism 
model came about from improved empirical knowledge about the 
legal reality in the Third World.139 Liberal legalism was based on 
“little . . . [to no] knowledge of [the] legal . . . [environments of] Asia, 
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Africa, and Latin America.”140 As the law and development 
movement grew, those who had done more empirical international 
research and who were less connected with liberal legalism came into 
the mix.141 Furthermore, foreign scholars came into the mix as well, 
including some from the Third World.142 This growth provided 
alternative views and challenged the liberal legalists to be more 
critical.143 
Despite this counterpoint and in light of the contextual differences 
between those faced by the liberal legalists and those faced by Prime 
Minister Abe, the Prime Minister should still implement some 
forceful legislation to improve gender equality. Another source of 
challenge to the liberal legalist model was the realization that perhaps 
policy makers may not actually be committed to the basic values 
which liberal legalists believed they were fostering.144 Is 
humanitarian rhetoric simply a means to mask ulterior motives like 
“military security or preservation of economic interests”?145 How 
much did development assistance contribute to U.S. foreign policy 
goals?146 Is there a conflict of interest where much of development 
assistance is government funded?147 As to Third World policy 
makers, despite a professed commitment to democracy, often such 
commitment is a front to conceal true intentions of protecting a ruling 
position.148 Therefore, this doubt about whether law can be an 
effective means for social change, which eventually led to the 
abandonment of law and development studies,149 emerged in part as a 
result of doubting true intentions of policy makers. But here, Prime 
Minister Abe is the policy maker. So he has the power to effect 
change through legislation. He should, however, realign his interests: 
humanitarian rhetoric of gender equality should not simply be a 
means to mask ulterior motives of preservation of economic interests. 
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CONCLUSION 
Abenomics contains many goals overshadowed by the realities of 
difficult implementation. There is too much hopeful wishing and not 
enough necessary legislation. This absence of sweeping reform leaves 
Abenomics precariously unstable or temporary and subject to 
changing leadership in the future. In the end, do the reasons for 
promoting gender equality even matter so long as we strive for a 
desirable outcome? In some respects, no. For example, on a general 
and aggregate level, increasing gender equality is generally 
considered a good thing (in modern Western philosophy) and should 
be something that countries seek to work toward. Most people would 
probably conclude that how or why a country reaches the end result is 
irrelevant, so long as the outcome is more equality between people. In 
other respects, however, the reasons for promoting gender equality do 
matter. For example, at a micro level, some of the more nuanced 
details will be overlooked and ignored. Abenomics strives for gender 
equality with respect to the quantity of working women however, it 
does nothing to close the gap on the disparate quality of life between 
working men and women. 
The purpose of the third arrow casts doubt on its ability to 
accomplish its goals. Further, the third arrow does not conform to the 
strict mandates imposed upon member countries to CEDAW. Finally, 
Abenomics’ conformity with CEDAW and the overall goal of 
boosting the economy are not mutually exclusive. For these reasons, 
Abenomics is a progressive step in a good direction, but to really 
accomplish its purpose of increasing women’s presence in the 
workforce, it needs to be about equality, not economics. Otherwise, 
such misguided and shortsighted efforts will fail. 
 
